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MONGOLIA IN  NORTHEAST  ASIA:  ISSUES  OF  SECURITY
SURVIVAL  AND  DIPLOMACY:  MONGOLIA’S  PLACE  IN  ASIA  TODAY
By Robert E. Bedeski, Ph.D.(Canada)
Abstract:
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia lost its twentieth century
protector, and has had to navigate Asian and global politics at a time when
China is becoming a dominant economic and military power.  Chinese economic
and demographic expansion will directly impact Mongolia and the precedent
of the sinification of Inner Mongolia demonstrates new challenges to the
isolated Mongolian Republic.  Energy imports, military security, trade
opportunities and investment climate are closely affected by China, and
Mongolian diplomatic efforts must take the southern giant into primary
consideration.
Geostrategic background
Centuries before the Qin dynasty unified the Chinese empire, the Han
peoples had an uneasy relationship with the nomadic herdsmen and warriors of
the northern frontiers.  Local kings constructed walls to protect their territory
from incursions.   The Great Wall remains as the historical frontier established
by Qin Shi Huangdi in 221 BC to keep out the precursors of Mongolians.  Han
emperors made alliances with far-off kingdoms to “use barbarians to control
the barbarians.” (Yi yi zhi yi) After each major dynasty, central Asian tribes
expanded at the expense of China, and often adapted Chinese technology and
institutions, as well as intermarried and assimilated into Han culture.  The Mongol
conquests in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries incorporated China into the
largest empire ever seen, and left subsequent Chinese states with historical
precedent that the northern frontier would always remain their Achilles heel.
During the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), Russian and Manchu overlords
jousted with each other, with the Korean Peninsula as the eastern anchor of the
long frontier.  Mongolia emerged as hapless buffer between the expanding
Russian and Chinese empires – not unlike Poland between Germany and Russia
in Eastern Europe.  The decline of Qing was accompanied by Han migrations
into Mongolia, a scramble for concessions, wars over who would succeed
Beijing as the hegemonic power in East Asia, and incorporation of the heretofore
unimportant (in a strategic sense) coastal regions into the global trade network.
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Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao, Dalian, Xiamen, and Tianjin all emerged as
new commercial and industrial cities, serving as entrepots between China and
the West, while Japan entered the ranks of the industrial Great Powers.
Similar to France, China has its two frontiers – continental and maritime.
But unlike France, China’s maritime frontier was activated largely in the past
century and a half.  Prior to the impact of the West, practically all Chinese
strategic attention was focused on inner Asia.  With the industrial revolution
and Western global expansion, China faced new threats – shrinking traditional
insecurities by comparison.  Simultaneously, though separately, the Chinese
and Russian empires crushed and absorbed central Asian societies into
themselves.  Since the mid-nineteenth century, China was concerned largely
with the threats from the West and Japan.  In no small part, the Chinese
Communist revolution succeeded because the Guomindang failed to stop the
Japanese, and was fueled by the promise of saving the nation from Western,
and then Soviet, domination.
After the 1917 Russian revolution, Mongolia became a pawn in Sino-
Russian relations.  The first decade of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
saw a period of Sino-Mongolian friendship, with aid and cooperation.  During
the Cultural Revolution, relations deteriorated, as they did with Russia.  Since
the mid-1980s, as China repaired relations with Russia, Mongolia was welcomed
with a warm embrace.
A Comprehensive Approach to Security: Co-existing with China
Today Mongolia is primarily concerned with national security and has
adopted a comprehensive, rather than strictly military, approach.   When
Mongolia ended her satellite relationship with the Soviet Union (March 1990),
the urgent priority was – and remains – to maintain national sovereignty through
security. From that time, Mongolia started reviewing its foreign and internal
policies and priorities and in 1994, the Mongolian parliament adopted three
important documents: concepts of national security, of foreign policy and
military doctrine. The national security concept reflected the country’s
geopolitical situation and role, and specifically defined Mongolia’s vital national
interests as well as the means of ensuring them. The five vital national interests
are:
a) existence of the Mongolian people and their civilization,
b) the country’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity,
inviolability of State borders,
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c) relative economic independence,
d) sustainable ecological development and
e) national unity.
All other interests are subordinate to them.1
The “Concept of National Security of Mongolia”2 states that
The vital national interests of Mongolia are the existence of the Mongolian
people and their civilization, the country’s independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity, inviolability of State frontiers, relative economic
independence, sustainable ecological development, and national unity. The
vital national interests of Mongolia constitute the object of special care and
protection on the part of the State and the people.
National security includes the following topics in the document:
To this writer, this represents a model operationalization of the concept of
human security, which has so far been more theoretical than actual:
Security of the Existence of Mongolia
Security of Social Order and State System
Security of Citizen’s Rights and Freedoms
Economic Security
Scientific and Technological Security
Information Security
Security of Mongolian Culture and Way of Life
Security of the Population and Its Gene pool
Ecological Security
While armed military forces exist, national security has a much more diffuse
approach – that of human security.  Mongolia realizes it cannot hope to halt
major aggression with military force, especially without allies, and must therefore
adopt a broad plan to survive.  Its approach is embodied in the “Concept”
document, and has similarities with Switzerland.
The document “Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine of Mongolia” puts
forward the need to conformity with universally recognized principles of
international law, and in particular Mongolia discards the use of force or the
threat to use force as a means of settling disputes. Furthermore it will not
participate in wars and conflicts unless it falls victim to foreign aggression.
Mongolia shall fulfill her UN Charter obligations and support UN activities.
1 http://www.un.int/mongolia/natsec.htm
2 The translated document is available at http://www.extmin.mn/
concept_of_national_security_ofm.htm
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Mongolia will not be part of any Military alliance unless the independence
and sovereignty of Mongolia is directly threatened, and will strictly adhere to
the policy of not allowing foreign troops to enter, be stationed in or pass
through the national territory in the absence of relevant Mongolian legislation.3
National security - the territorial dimension
Geography has influenced Mongolia’s destiny.  The country is bordered
on the north by Russia, and was a satellite of the Soviet Union for nearly 70
years.  With Soviet collapse, troops were pulled out, leaving garrison sites as
virtual ghost towns, with unknown toxic and possibly radioactive waste dumps.
Post-Communist Russia continues to exercise economic influence.  When
Russian fuel supplies declined, exports to Mongolia were stopped – the only
source for them.  In 2000, Mongolia began to import fuel from China in small
quantities.  Too great dependency on China for anything as strategic as energy
would only trade one patron for another.
Mongolia has a 4776 km border with China’s Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang.
This long boundary has been relatively stable since the 1920s.  The last military
aggression against Mongolia was in the 1939 Khalkh Gol War when a Japanese
attack was beaten back with major Soviet assistance, preventing incorporation
into Manchukuo and Korea.  Soviet Russia and Mongolia had signed a joint
treaty of support on March 12, 1936, and in July 1939, 38,000 Japanese troops
attacked with artillery, tanks and planes, outnumbering the defenders in artillery
and troops by a factor of three, and 4.5 times the cavalry.  The Mongolians and
Russians had an advantage in tanks, and the battle of Bayantsagaan cost the
Japanese heavily.4  A tall memorial, visible from most parts of Ulaanbaatar,
commemorates Soviet wartime assistance.  Today, there is no longer Russian
military support for Mongolian territorial integrity, although a cooperative
relationship exists.5
Management of long borders with its two neighbors has been an ongoing
concern.  The frontiers are sparsely populated, and relatively open.  Maintaining
control of borders is a vital part of preserving Mongolian sovereignty.  Under
joint agreement, inspection of border markers has been underway.  China and
3 “Mongolia’s Military Doctrine and Legislation“, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~corff/
im/Buch/WhitePaper-4.html
4  Mongolian Messenger, 990908,8
5 Border problems of smuggling and cattle rustling have become irritants on the
Mongolia-Russia border.  A joint Conference was held in Irkutsk on February 18, 2000 to
address these concerns.  Mongolian Messenger, March 2, 2000, p. 2.
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Mongolia signed a 1964 protocol to have border inspections every five years.
Full checks occurred in 1984, and took over two years.  Many markers and
stations were reported in disrepair6, and recently, another review of the border
was completed in 2004.
Mongolia faces China
Mongolia’s emergence as a fully independent modern nation-state was
retarded for seventy years as a protectorate of the Soviet Union.  The national
security concept of Mongolia changed dramatically after the end of the Cold
War and the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1992 from Mongolia’s
territory. While Mongolia used to serve as a buffer state between China and
Russia during the Cold War, the Mongolians participated in the defense system
of the Warsaw Pact States acting as the Eastern frontier, effectively shielding
the former Soviet Union from direct contact with her estranged former comrade,
the People’s Republic of China. China was regarded the enemy, a threat not
only to the USSR but also to Mongolia. It was the mission of the Mongolian
army to build up armaments and the number of military personnel to a level
sufficient to carry out joint operations with the Soviet armed forces.7
With the collapse of the Soviet system, Mongolia seized its sovereignty
and set up a democracy.  At the same time China has been developing into a
global power based on authoritarianism and a dynamic market economy.  Russia
prefers Mongolia to remain as a sovereign buffer state between itself and China,
but is in no position to help in a crisis.
Mongolia’s dilemma is geopolitical: First, geography renders it vulnerable
to its two very large neighbors.  Second, when either neighbor is expanding,
Mongolia is directly affected.  In the Soviet period this meant incorporation
into the Communist ideological, political, military, and economic system.  During
the first decade of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet alliance insured that the Soviet-
imposed status quo in Inner Asia would remain intact.  With the rift between
Moscow and Beijing, Mongolian relations with China also deteriorated.  With
the re-normalization of Sino-Russian relations, Mongolia has followed suit.
But while the two giants enjoy rough equivalence in national power, Mongolia
has no such luxury, and must navigate its diplomacy with extreme caution.
6 Mongolian Messenger, 5 May 1999, p. 8.
7 “Security Issues and the National Defense Concept”, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/
~corff/im/Buch/WhitePaper-3.html
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Chinese strategists see the integration of economic and security interests
as a key development in the post-Cold War era.  With Deng Xiaoping’s 1978
reforms transforming the Chinese economic system from centrally-planned
socialism into a market-oriented economy, growth has been significant.  Western
analysts, businesses and politicians optimistically anticipate that this economic
growth will generate a new middle class and pressures for democratization.  A
more realistic view is that China pragmatically views economic growth as the
central component to increasing national strength.  The demise of the Soviet
Union as protector and underwriter of Mongolia has given China an opening
on its northern frontier to expand its influence over a critical historical buffer.
Mongolia’s new independence, with a market economy and intense
national pride, faces a dynamic Chinese economy and few alternative partners
for trade and investment.  In 2001, 53.7 % of Mongolia’s exports were to China,
followed by 22% to the U.S. and 10.3% to the Russian Federation.8
The cashmere industry: Chinese economic penetration?
One example of China’s penetration into the Mongolian economy is the
cashmere industry.  In the years 1991-96, Mongolia had a trade surplus, but
1997 saw a $38 million deficit, reflecting a growing dependency on China.
Unprocessed raw materials occupy up to 90% of exports to China.  Cashmere,
a major cash product, depends on the China market.  Around 40-60% of basic
food commodities, such as flour, rice & sugar, are imported from China.
The case of Mongolia’s cashmere industry illustrates how economics can
be a weapon of Chinese national interest, at the expense of a neighboring state.
The cashmere industry has been a test case for Mongolia-China economic
relations, and Ulaanbaatar cannot be too optimistic.  In 1998, the industry
accounted for 15% of GDP, directly, and indirectly employing around 10,000
workers.  Chinese merchants began paying higher prices for the raw cashmere,
which was then sent to China for processing.  After significant investment in
processing equipment, Mongolia saw supplies severely decrease, causing
extensive layoffs.  Critics feared a Chinese agenda to take over Mongolia’s 30%
of world market and create a monopoly by driving Mongolian processors out
of business.  They pointed to the state-owned China Agricultural Bank providing
interest-free loans to 22 Chinese cashmere companies as evidence.  Apologists
say the Chinese are simply better businessmen.
8 http://www.investmongolia.com/m6.htm
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Mongolia produces average of 3,500 tons of cashmere annually, or 30%
of the world total.  Of the 46 companies involved in purchasing and processing
cashmere in Mongolia, 22 were Chinese, and an investigation in May 2000
indicated that 15 of these were not in conformity with law the requires processing
in Mongolia to qualify for a tax exemption. Also, some companies operated in
Mongolia without legal registration.  Another problem for the Mongolian
processors is that they were paying US$35-38 versus Chinese prices of $40-42
per kilogram.  A similar situation is emerging in the trade in wool and sheepskins,
with Chinese higher prices removing a raw material from the country.  China
procures 67% of the global cashmere output (15,000 tons) compared to
Mongolia’s 21%.
In early May, 2000 the government of Mongolia imposed a temporary
moratorium on the export of raw cashmere, since native companies were laying
off employees for lack of material.  This appears to violate rules of the WTO,
which Mongolia joined in 1995.  The Multifibre Arrangement will end in the next
few years, with expected flight of textile factories from Mongolia9.  In 2001, the
government privatized Gobi Joint Stock Company, and purchased about 75%
of its stock.  It is an integrated company that procures processes, manufactures
and distributes cashmere products, with 80% of its output sold to the European
Union, the United States, Japan, and Russia.10
Land reform - privatization
Another key political issue was land privatization.  A major concern was
that once land became a commodity, Chinese investors or their fronts would
purchase property and become de facto landowners of Mongolian real estate.
A law on land was passed in June 200211, and reserved ownership to Mongolian
citizens, companies and organizations.  Under article 6.3,
Foreign countries, international organizations, foreign legal entities,
foreign citizens and stateless persons may become users of land for a specific
purpose and a specific time period subject to contract conditions and in
compliance with the law.
On 1 May 2003 the law on land ownership came into force. It meant that
for the first time in the country’s history, Mongolian citizens were entitled to
own land. The government, under pressure from the opposition party and its
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supporters, passed the legislation in order to modernize the economy and
provide a source of collateral for financial expansion.  However, fears still remain
that foreigners may take advantage to buy property assets.
Foreign Investment12
Another area of sovereignty concern is foreign investment.  The major
legislation was passed in 1993.13  In 2000, Mongolia’s Foreign Investment and
Foreign Trade Agency oversaw more than 1400 foreign corporations from 53
countries.  There are 483 joint and single Chinese enterprises in Mongolia in
mining, service, agriculture, and light industry.  Under law, a Joint cooperative
enterprise requires minimum of US$10,000, and one person could own multiple
companies.  Most Chinese companies are small, and a re-registration of foreign
companies in 1999 revealed that nearly 50% of them were in non-compliance
with the law.
Mongolia increasingly depends on the dynamic Chinese economy, and
the government hopes that other foreign countries can invest here for
diversification.  The government emphasizes mining, agriculture, and tourism.
Before 1991, much food was raised in Mongolia, but with privatization and loss
of state subsidies, domestic food production suffered.
Foreign investment has risen from US$965,000 in 1990 to $350 million in
1999, with nearly 70% in geology, mining and prospecting.  In the past ten
years, 26% of foreign investment came from Hong Kong, with 18.8% from China,
6.7% from Korea, 5.6% U.S., and 4.5% Russian.14
In December, 1998 President Bagabandi visited China – the highest level
visit by a Mongolian official to China since Tsedenbal in 1962.15  China agreed
to provide soft loan credits of US$12 million to Mongolia, and there were talks
on the gas pipeline from Russia through Mongolia, as well as a $39.7 million
deal to build Mongolia’s first oil refinery.  Since 1990 through 1998, Chinese
traders invested $60 million in Mongolia.  In 1994 the two countries signed a
new treaty defining bilateral relations.  At the time, trade with China occupied
30% of Mongolian foreign trade, and trade in 1997 was five times that of 1990.16
12 Interview with J. Chin-Erdene, Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency– see
entry in Outlook/Contacts/China.
13 For text of the law, see http://www.indiana.edu/~mongsoc/mong/invest.htm
14 Mongolian Messenger, February 23,2000, p. 4.
15 Mongolian Messenger, 981216, 3
16 Mongolian Messenger, 981216, 3.
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It was hoped that the Russia-China gas pipeline (a US$10 billion project)
could spur Mongolia development. However, the Chinese insisted that the
Angarsk line bypass Mongolia, even though it was more expensive. There is
also the problem of relatively little infrastructure or experience in Mongolia.
Increased importation and use of gas might sacrifice Mongolia’s established
coal industry – 13,000 coal miners could lose jobs.17  Moscow has been shifting
its plans, and recently favored an all-Russian route to Nakhodka, for the benefit
of Japan.  The gas and oil pipeline was still under negotiation in late 2004, and
could be critical for Mongolia as a “transit country”.18
The demographic dimension
Chinese emigration is increasingly a strategic issue.19  According to
Tsedendamba Batbayar,20
Although after 1990 Chinese-Mongolian relations have improved
significantly, Chinese economic and social influence has been gradually and
(for the Mongolians) worrisomely increasing, which is demonstrated in a
privatization bill in the national legislature shelves fearing loopholes allowing
foreigners (i. e. Chinese) to acquire land through local parties. China has a huge
population of some 1.3 billion to Mongolia’s 2.5 million. The neighboring Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Region has a population of some 20 million to
Mongolia’s 2.5 million. At any time some 100 million people are on the move in
China seeking a better life within the country, from rural to urban areas, in
search of employment or new opportunities abroad. China’s population density
is 127 times greater, making Mongolia seem like a land of frontier opportunity
for some Chinese. Mongolia has difficulty in defending itself from Chinese
influence on a variety of fronts from imported goods, foodstuff, to business
and investment, intermarriage and illegal immigration or settlement. So both
countries are opening their economies to freer trade, but at a price that threatens
Mongolian cultural identity and economic independence.
Border control is a vital part of comprehensive security to prevent
smuggling and illegal migration – a growing problem throughout the world.
But a more crucial issue is the dynamics of demography for Mongolia.  Harsh
17 Mongolian Messenger, 991110, 7
18 The term was used by President Bagabandi in his remarks at University of British
Columbia on October 25, 2004.
19 Smith, Paul J.   “The Strategic Implications of Chinese Emigration.”  Survival.
(36:2, Summer 1994)
20 Foreign Migration Issues in Mongolia, www.un-mongolia.mn/undp
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climate and topography will limit Mongolia’s population.  About 27% of
approximately 2.5 million Mongolians live in Ulaanbaatar.  Registration for
residence there costs citizens Tugrik 26,000 for adults, and 13,000 for children.21
A Centre for Civil Registration centralizes and coordinates citizen registration,
issuing certificates and passports.  Acquisition or loss of citizenship is no easy
matter – only four persons were granted citizenship in 2001 – a process that
requires approval of the national President.
In 1994, the government established the Council of Foreigner Affairs under
the Ministry of Justice, to supervise foreigners living in Mongolia.  By 2002, it
had deported 41 persons, and denied 30 residence privileges.  The Council has
fifteen members, including top representatives from the Ulaanbaatar municipal
government, intelligence, border guards, central police, the Foreign Ministry,
customs service, the Foreign Investment Board, and the Council on National
Security.  It reports annually to the President.
The Hural (legislature) annually sets limits on the proportion of foreign
residents.  Under the 1994 citizenship law, no more than 1% of population can
be foreign and 0.33% (of the total national population) of any one nationality.
Mongolia also tries to discourage Mongolians from emigrating or becoming
foreign citizens.  An official breakdown of foreign residents indicates around
1,520 Chinese, 1,493 Russians, with 7,554 in other categories, including stateless,
and short or long term temporary permits.  This works out to 0.4% foreigners,
well below the Hural limits, although one must always allow for under-counting.
Mongolia demographers indicate country could support 4-5 m people.
Ulaanbaatar family’s average 2.4 children, rural families have 3.1, so population
is still growing while almost prohibiting immigration.
Foreign residents
Relations with China were poor in the 1970s and early 1980s; Mongolia
criticised China’s treatment of its Mongolian citizens and was in turn accused
by Beijing of seeking to expel its estimated 7,000-person Chinese community. In
1984, the Mongolian Government expelled 1,700 Chinese, but did not bother
assimilated ethnic Chinese citizens. The animosity may account for the absence
of any reference to a Chinese minority in the 1989 census. A more recent source
indicates that there are 35,000 Chinese in Mongolia. Mongolian police have
arrested illegal immigrants from China (including ethnic Mongolians from Inner
Mongolia), some of whom were carrying false Mongolian passports.
21 Mongolian Messenger, 990217,6
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Mongolia does not recognize dual citizenship, and foreigners retain their
original passports.  Prior to 1990, Mongolia had a large population of Soviet
engineers and other specialists working under contract in Mongolia, plus an
estimated 55,000 Soviet troops, but they were always viewed as “helpful
foreigners” and not included in Mongolian census figures. Although since
1920, many Russians have settled in the Tannu Tuva and Buryat Mongol regions
of Siberia across the border from northern Mongolia, there has been little Russian
migration to, and settlement in, Mongolia. Agreements reached in March 2002
between the Russian and Mongolian Governments mean that, in theory,
nationals of each country resident in the other country can use the other
country’s healthcare system. Moscow claimed that Mongolia owed about US$10
billion, and has agreed to settle the debt after payment of $250 million in 2003,
which boosted Mongolian credit.
Conclusion
At the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
democracy was predicted to be the dominant form of government, international
prosperity would be globalized through the spread of trade and technology,
and peace would be preserved through multilateralism and UN leadership.
Those promises have turned sour, with African economic backsliding, Islamist
fundamentalism, U.S. hegemonism, and the dysfunctionality of the U.N.
Mongolia was to be a beneficiary of the “New World Order”, but faces a long-
term challenge to its survival – not because of broken promises, but rather as
the unforeseen result of the radical transformations of China and Russia.  Her
seventy year accommodation with the Soviet Union provided protection within
the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, and now she is on her own, facing the Chinese
demographic and economic giant relatively alone.
Russia has her own problems and is not seen as a solution to Mongolia’s
security problems.  Through diplomacy, Mongolia has sought to maintain her
non-alignment, so far declining to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), an intergovernmental international organization founded in Shanghai
on 15 June 2001 by six countries, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  Its member states cover an area of over 30 million
km2, or about three fifths of Eurasia, with a population of 1.455 billion, about a
quarter of the world’s total.   Its working languages are Chinese and Russian.22
22 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm
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One of the expectations of the New World Order was that state sovereignty
would become obsolete, with a global regime of international law, multilateralism,
NGOs, and the UN as watchdog of human rights.  Mongolia saw this vision
dissolve, and is absolutely committed to preserving her national sovereignty
through human security and international diplomacy.  Despite small population
and a smaller military establishment, Mongolia has sent peacekeepers participate
in the US-led expedition in Iraq, and hosts a U.S. military mission, which provides
90 percent of foreign military training and assistance.23
For Mongolia, the sovereign nation-state is not obsolete – an informal
alliance with the U.S. may be the most effective means of surviving in a location
of extreme vulnerability.  At the same time, Mongolians will have to firmly yet
politely draw the line between themselves and China to avoid the fate of
absorption that has taken place in Inner Mongolia.  For Canada, these realities
must remain uppermost in our relationship with both countries.  Despite
Mongolia’s risky existence, Canada can contribute to the survival of a state,
people and civilization which made major contributions to the early globalization
of humanity through development assistance, cultural and educational links,
investment, and diplomatic supports.  As President Bagabandi said in Vancouver
in 2004, both Canada and Mongolia are in bed with elephants – his country’s
dilemma is that there are two, while Canadians only have to worry about one.
23 Robert Kaplan, “The Man Who Would Be Khan”, The Atlantic Monthly, March
2004, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200403/kaplan
